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ABSTRACT
In this technical report, a general formula for the ft-value





Consider a two-person zero-sum game with matrix [a..] which is
being played for one unit of time. If in a time interval At player 1
plays row i and player 2 column j the payoff to player 1 is a. .At.
Payoffs are accumulated with time so that the total payoff is
a., dt.
Of course, if instantaneous changes of rows or columns were allowed the
integral would not be defined. John Danskin [1] has proposed to resolve
this dilemma by approximating the game by n-stage games with perfect
information. In the n-stage approximation, player 2 is allowed to change
the column index only at times t = — ; k = 0,1,..., n-1, while player 1
n
k a
is allowed to change the row index only when t = -- + — , where ^ a £ 1
n n
is a fixed parameter. The payoff is then
1
a., dt = — J aa. . + (l-a)a. . .
The row index i„ is called the predecessor. We denote this game




ft (a;i_) = min max ... min max — ) aa. . + (l-a)a. . (1.1)
i. i, ji k=l lc-1 k k kJ l 1 J n n








converges to a limit which does not depend on the predecessor i_. This
limit
JJ(o) = lim fi (a;i
rt )
n U
is then called the fl-value of a matrix-differential game [a..].
ij
The main purpose of this technical report is to establish the








be a matrix, let I = {1,2} be the index set, let
£ a £ 1 Denote M = max max {a.
. } , M = min min {a. . }
,
1€I j€I 1J 1€I j€I 1J
V = min max { a . . } , V_ = max min { a . . } , and
Then
jGI i€I ij 1€I j€I ij
v(a) = -[a (MHO + (l-a)(M+V)].
fi
V if v(a) ^ V,
) if V < v(a) < V,(a) = v(a
V if v(a) ^ V.
(1.3)
We provide two independent proofs of this formula, each using a
different approach—Shubert's (Sec. 2) or Washburn's (Sec. 3). These two
sections can be read independently. The notation is common. A brief
comparison and discussion of the two approaches is contained in Sec. 4,
together with some ideas about possible generalization to larger games.
2. Shubert's Approach .
From (1.1) it is easily seen that ft (a;*) satisfy the recurrence
relation
Q ,, (cr;k) = min max{—— [aa. . + (l-o)a. .] +
-§r n (cr;i)>, k 6 I, (2.1)
n-r± n-rl Ki ii n+1 nj€I i€I J J
with initial condition fi„ = 0. This relation could be used to evaluate
ft (a) , which can be done on a computer provided numerical values for a
and the entries a. . are given.
However, if we wish to obtain the entire function ft(*) and establish
some of its properties, the recurrence relation (2.1) may be of little help.
An analogy with similar problems suggests that perhaps ft(*) can also be
found as a solution of a functional equation obtained from (2.2) by letting
n -> °°. Unfortunately, such a process would yield the equation
fl(» ;k) = min max ft(*;i),
j i
which is satisfied by any function such that ft(a;k) = ft(a;£) for k ^ I.
In what follows we are going to show that the difficulty can never-
theless be circumvented by solving the equation
Q(cr;k) = min max {A [aa +(l-a)a.
. ] + (l-A)fl(o;i) } , k € I, (2.2)
j€I i€I J 1J
where < X £ 1 is a parameter.
We first prove that this equation has a unique solution, depending,
of course, on the parameter \. Next we show that as \ -> this solution
converges to the fi-value. As a byproduct we obtain a new proof for the
convergence of the sequence (1.2). Finally, by actually finding the solu-
tion of (2.2) for small A > and letting A -> we establish the formula
(1.3) for the fi-value.
We begin with some definitions. To simplify notation we temporarily
suppress a and abbreviate
h.
.
= era, . + (l-a)a.
.
,
where i (; I
, j G I , k 6 I
.




.(X,x) = Xhk . + (l-X)x.
16 1, k
€
I, j € I,







T (X ,x) = min max H
.
.
(X ,x) ; k C I.k j€I i€I 1J




6 Re2 , 2^ " T(^,£,), n = l,2,... (2.4)








so that x ,x
9 ,
. . . is indeed the sequence defining the ft-value of the
fi-game with matrix A.







let a be a constant such that








Re2 : |x| £ a}
We are now ready to state the following theorem
Theorem 1 : Let ^ X £ 1, let T be the mapping defined by (2.3) and
restricted to the domain X, let x.i »2E.o » * * " be the sequence (2.4). Then
the following is true.
(1) For every < X £ 1. there is a unique fixed point
x(X) = T(X,x(X)).
(2) The limit
lim x(X) = £ = (£,,£,)
X+0
exists and £.. = £~.
(3) The sequence x. ,x~»... converges and
lim x = lim x(X)
ir*10 x->0
Proof : The proof is divided into a sequence of eight lemmas. Lemma 3
proves statement (1) , Lemma 7 statement (2) and Lemma 8 statement (3)
.
We would like to point out that the proof may seem rather uneconomical
for the two-by-two case (for instance, Lemma 3 can be proved without
using Banach's theorem)
.
We, nevertheless, leave it in its present form with an eye on
possible generalization.















^ max max max |Xh. . + (l-X)x.
|
kei i€I j€I 1J X
£ Xa + (1-X)
|
|x| | £ a if x £ X.
Lemma 2 : For any ^ X £ 1




Proof : If (f ,f ) and (g ,g ) are any two real vectors then


















Using these two inequalities in the reversed order we obtain
i till k k|T(X,x) -T(X,_x)| = max|min max H.
.
(X ,x_) - min max H
. .
(X ,x' )










k€I J6I 161 LJ 161 XJ
I
k k
i£ max max max | H .
.

















Lemma 3 : For every < X £ 1 there is a unique x 6 X such that
T(X,x) = x\
Proof : By Lemma 2 the map T is for any fixed < X £ 1 a contraction
and by Lemma 1 it maps a closed bounded set X into itself. Hence by
Banach's fixed point theorem it must have a unique fixed point.















l(X) -h|q ,?2 (X) =h|q+ X(hl p-h2q), (2.6)
or
hj + h^ - Xh?
r (x\ = 2 p iq iq1 U) 2 - X














(X) = h* . (2.8)
fs*t t f+*
Proof : Since x = (x ,x ) is a fixed point of the map T(A,*) we must
have









, j € I, P € I> q€I. Choosing values 1 or 2 for the
index i and the index j we obtain four sets of pairs of linear equations




= Xh* + (1-X)^
x
±
= Xh* + (l-X)x,
x
2


















The solution of each set gives the corresponding expression (2. 5) -(2. 8)
Lemma 5 ; lim |x (X) - x (X) | = 0.
X+0
Proof: Assume the statement is false, i.e. there is e^ > such that















(X) = h^ (2.9)
h
lp -
h 2ql * V (2 ' 10)
Next since x(X) is a fixed point
Hi (A,x) ^ Hi (X,x),
and






and because of (2.9) this implies
Substituting from (2.9) we obtain
Xh! + (l-X)hl £ Xhl + (l-X)h*
,lp lp 2p 2q
and
Xh2 + (l-X)h? ^ Xh2 + (l-X)hl
,2q 2q lq lp
which is equivalent to
hi - h2 <; X (h.i -h§ ).
lp 2q lp 2q
However, these two inequalities cannot hold for arbitrarily small X >
unless h} = h£
,
which contradicts (2.10). The lemma is proved,
lp 2q'
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Lemma 6 : Let f_ = (f , . . . > f .) and e = (g , . . . ,g ) , j = l,...,n
be given vectors. Let for every < X £ X at least one of the n
inequalities Xf_. £ j> be satisfied,
Then there is a X 6 (0,A ] such that if the inequality
Xf. £ g. is satisfied for A = A^, it is satisfied for any < X £ X^.
-^o "% ° °
Proof: Since all these inequalities are linear there is, for every j,
a closed interval J. c [0,X ] such that the j-th inequality is satisfied
if and only if X ^ J . . Although some of those intervals may be vacuous
the system {J ,...,J } must cover (0,X ] since by assumption at least
one of the inequalities is satisfied for any X £ (0,X,]. Hence, there
must be at least one interval with nonempty interior and left endpoint
zero, say J. = [0,X_], X
n
> 0, and the statement follows.
3 Q U U
Lemma 7 : There exists X
n
> 0, a vector jj_ = (£ ,£ ) , and a vector
b_ = (b ,b ) such that either







Y for all < A £ A . (2.12)
In either case the vector £ is such that
Proof : By Lemma 5 the fixed point x^(A) is given by one of the expressions
(2.5)-(2.8). Since p and q generally depend on A this leaves 16
possibilities.
11
Since x(\) i-s a fixed point there is p £ I, q 6 I, r £ I,
s £ I, in general depending on A, such that
x
n
= H 1 (X ,x) = min max H*
.
(X ,x")
,1 pq ja i€i 1J
and
x = H 2 (X,x) = min max H 2 .(X,x).
1 rs j€I i€I 1J
But A = min[max(A,B) , max(C,D)] is equivalent to
A ;> B and A £ C
or
A ^ B and A <; D.
Hence, (2.13) is satisfied (with some specific p, q, r, s) if and only
if at least one of the resulting four systems of four inequalities between
pairs of the H's is satisfied. Now, each of these inequalities is of
the form
Xh + (l-X)x^Xh' + (l-X)x'
,
(2.14)
where h and h each stands for one of the h.. s and x and x
each for one of the two components of x.
By Lemma 6 there must be X > such that for < X £ X x(^)
cannot be given by (2.8) unless hj = h2 .
Hence, substituting for x and x' any one of the expressions
(2.5)-(2.7) or the expression (2.8) with hj - h2 the inequality (2.14)
lp 2q
becomes either
X(h-h') + (l-X)XB ;>
or
(2-X)X(h-h') + (l-X)XB >
12
where B is a constant involving the h 's. But X, being positive,
can be canceled and the inequalities become linear in X.
Thus we have a finite number of systems of four linear inequalities
and since the fixed point _x exists by Lemma 3 for every < X £ 1 at
least one of the systems must be satisfied for every < X _£ X . Hence,
by Lemma 6 there is a X > such that if a particular system is satis-
fied for X = X„ it remains satisfied for all < X ^ X_. Consequently,
the indexes p, q, r, s, which identify the fixed point for X = X_
will remain unchanged as X decreases to zero. Hence _x(X) will for
every < X £ X be given by one of the expressions (2. 5) -(2. 7) with p
and q no longer changing with X and thus by Lemma 5 must have one of
two forms (2.11) or (2.12) with E, = E, . The lemma is proved.
Lemma 8 : Let x , x_ , . . . be a sequence satisfying (2.4), let




— —1 —I —n —
X->0 n-x»








i^J.i+k^K for every n = 0,l,..., (2.16)
k=0
—2




|5_-2bJ | (2-Xn ) } and ^ n jb_ are those of Lemma 7.
Such an N exists for any e > since the harmonic series is Cesaro
summable to zero.
Let n be a nonnegative integer. By Lemma 2
I I x: - x(—) II = I I T(— x ) - Tf— x(—) I I
1 l2%+n -^N+n ; ' ' I I UN+n '%+n-r UN+n '-^N+n ; ' '
N+n-1 1| *», 1 N i i /o i -7\
13
and by triangular inequality
~/ 1 s I I II ~/i=wi - *W 1
1
£
I liw-i - *<s*h:> 1
1
+
1 life) - *<5sb:) 1 1 (2 - 18)
By Lemma 7 if < X £ X
n









||x(X) - x(X')|| <; |X - X'| |^x")^^
depending on which of the two expressions (2.11) and (2.12) applies.
Hence
I l- (N+n") " - (N+n-l } ' ' * (N+n) (N+n-1) (2.19)
Putting (2.17), (2.18) and (2.19) together and calling 11*™+ - Efer-) I I
= A we have
n
N+n-1 K_
n * N+n n-1 (N+n) z
Iterating we obtain eventually
+ -5- V i
^0 N+n , £ kn N+n C k=0
for every n = 0,1,... and hence by (2.15) and (2.16) and the obvious
fact that £ |A £ a, the radius of X, we have
i i n i i
A < e for every n = 0,1,... .
n
Thus lim A < e for any e > so that lim |x - x(—) = and
n ' '—n — n '
'
n-H» n-x»





Now we can proceed with the proof of the formula for the ft-value,
Theorem 2: The formula (1.3) is true.
Proof : Since always V £ V we distinguish two cases.
Case 1 : V < V
With no loss of generality assume that the matrix A is such that
a
ll "*
a22 ^ max{a12 ,a21 >,
relabelling the entries if necessary. Then we have
M = a , V = a and V = max{a „,a J.








ij kj ij xj '- ij k
Notice that in this notation
v(o) - ICh^+hf,)
and that if k=i, h.. - a. ..
il ij






























































(X,x) - H^U.x) = X[h
22





if and only if h^ £ hj , which is true since h^ = a and h* = a
Thus for small X >















which is true since h^ = a~_. Hence, for small X >
H^ (X ,x_) = min max H^ . (X ,x) »
16
which together with (2.21) and (2.22) means that for all X > 0, in some
neighborhood of zero (2.20) is a fixed point of the mapping (2.3). Conse-
quently by Theorem 1 the fi-value
0(0) - lim x. - h* = a .
x->-o
Case 1.2: v(a) ^ V
Let p € I and q € I be such that V = a . Notice that p f q
so that




x = hP , x = Xhq + (l-X)hP (2.23)
p pq q pp pq
x = HP (X,x) and x = Hq (X,x). (2.24)
pq - q PP
Similarly as in Case 1.1.
HF - H p ^0 « 2hp - 2v(a) > 0,
pq qq pq
which is true since h = a = V. Next
pq pq
rP - . /i,P _t.P
so that
HF - H F = X(hF -hK ) = X(a -a ) £ 0,
pq pp pq pp pq pp
HP = min max Hp
. .
(2.25)






Hq - Hq :> o hP - hq ;>
pp qp pq qp
hP =a = V ^ M = a = hq
,
pq pq - qp qp
Hq - Hq £ o hp - hq £
pp qq pq qq
a £ a Hence
pq qq
Hq = min max Hq
. (2.26)
PP . . ij
J l
= v,P =and (2.23)-(2.26) imply fl(a) h p = V.
Case 1.3. V < v(a) < V
Calling again _V = a we now take
x - -±- (2v(a) - Ahq )
,
P 2-A pp




so that for small A >
HP - HP ;> if and only if 2(hP -hP ) + hq - hP £
qq pq qq pq pp qq
But this is equivalent to
2v(a) - 2h^ ^ 0,
pq
(2.27)
x = HP (A,x)
, x = H
q (A,x). (2.28)
p qq - q pp -
HP - HP = A[hP - hP +^4 (^ "hP )]
qq pq qq pq 2-A pp qq
18
which is true since h = a = V. Similarly
pq pq -
HP - HP £ « 2(hP -hP ) + h q - hP £ « 2v(a) - 2hP £
qq pp qq pp pp qq pp
since
hP = a ^ V and v(a) < V.
PP PP
Thus
HP = min max Hp
. (2.29)
qq . . ij
J i
Finally
Hq - Hq ;> « 2(hq -hq ) + hP - hq ;> « 2v(a) - 2a :>
pp qp pp qp qq pp qp
since a = M, and
qp -
Hq - Hq <; « 2(hq -hq ) + hP - hq :£ « 2v(a) - 2hq <;
pp qq pp qq qq pp qq
since v(a) < V ^ a . Hence
qq




PP • • ij
J i
and (2. 27) -(2. 30) yield
ft (a) = v(a) .
Case 2 : V = V
Although we could use the same procedure as in Case 1 again we prefer
a simpler argument. If V = V = V then the matrix A has a saddle, say
a, = V. Since every n-stage ft-game G (a;k), being a game with perfect
tcJc n
information, has a pure value we must have
ft (a;k) = V for every n = 1,2,...
19
But by Theorem 1 lim ft (a;i) = ft (a) regardless of i £ I. Hence
n
ft (a) = V for all ^ o £ 1 and the theorem is proved.
20
3. Washburn's Approach .
We will proceed to prove formula (1.3) by showing that Player I
can get at least ft (a) + 0(l/n) , that Player II can prevent player I
from getting more than ft (a) + 0(l/n) , and that ft (a) = ft (a) =
ft (a) . The two functions ft (a) and ft (a) will be defined within the
theorem. For future reference, let the clockwise and counterclockwise
averages be














cc 11 11 11 21
Theorem: Formula (1.3) is true.
Proof: We will show that players I and II can asymptotically confine them-
selves to four strategies each, those strategies being the four functions
mapping {1,2} onto itself. For example, the strategy (2,1) for I
means that I will always choose 2 if II has previously chosen 1, or
1 if II has previously chosen 2. We will use the symbol s + x to mean
that the strategy s for I assures that the average payoff to I will be
at least x + 0(l/n) , where n is the number of moves, regardless of
the starting state. Similarly for II.


















(2.2) ^ min{a21 ,a22 }







(1.1) ^ max{an ,a21 }
(2.2) |^. max{a12 ,a22 > .
For example, consider the strategy (1,2) for I. After n stages, let
n..(n. .) be the number of visits to state (i,j) initiated by I (II).
Then as long as I uses (1,2), regardless of the starting point,




















Since the average payoff to I is
I _ 1 v r . I f . N II vV
d,2) -nU (nij (1-ff) + nij a)air
22
a lower bound on v, . can be obtained by solving a linear programming






p.. = n../n and p.. = n../n,
ij iJ ij ij
and neglect terms that are 0(l/n), the program is
min I liv\.{l-a) + p** a]a.. i v (1>2)
K- *. 4. I II IIsubject to Pll = p21 + Pll
I II II
P22









n pJJ - 1 ';
There are six equations in eight variables. There is an optimal solution
in which at least two of the variables, in addition to p and P -,.->>











and if p = 0, v. . = a . If p
2
_
= 0, v, . is some mixture of
a.. , and a__. In all cases, (1,2) + min{v (a) ,a, . ,a__} . Essentially,
II IJ. 1 C 11 2.2.
II has his choice of either going around in a clockwise circle or else
acepting one of the two payoffs that I keeps trying to obtain. The rest
of the -* statements can be obtained similarly.
Taking account of all four of I's (II 's) strategies, we see that




(a) + 0(l/n) and ftXI (a) + 0(l/n)
, where
ft (a) = max{min (v (a) ,a ,a ) ,min(v (a) ,a ,a ) ,V}
CC 1Z Zl c 11 11 —
ft (cr) = min{max(v (a) ,a ,a ) ,max{v (a) ,a_ ,a 01 } ,V}cc 11 Z/ c 1Z Zl
I II
The fact that 9. (a) = ft (a) = ft(a) can be shown by exhaustion of cases.
Since ft (a) ^ V and ft
X
(a) ^ V, the proof is trivial if V = V. If
there is no saddle point, suppose a or a
?
_ is the largest element
M. It follows that the term involving v (a) may be deleted from both
ft (a) and ft (a) , that the second largest element V is on the same
diagonal, and also that v(cr) = v (a). The result is that
ft
1




Both of these expressions are equivalent to 1.3. A similar proof holds
if a or a is the largest element.
QED
24
4 . Comparison of Techniques and Prognosis for Larger Games .
The 2x2 game would be much easier to solve if it could be
discovered that the function ft (a) satisfies some simple functional
equation that has a unique solution. This does not seem to be the case.
Shubert deals with this problem by inventing a situation that is almost
as good. He introduces a function ft (a ,X ,k) (x,(A) in his notation)
which does satisfy such a functional equation, and then shows that
lim ft(a,A,k) = fl(a) regardless of the index k. He next shows there
A+0
are only a finite number of candidates for the solution of the equation,
one of which must apply for all X smaller than some positive A~.
Given the matrix A, he finds the solution, and consequently ft (a)
.
This procedure is probably generalizable to larger games. The difficulty
will be that the number of candidate solutions will grow very fast with
the size of the matrix. It is possible, however, that a systematic
procedure can be found to determine the correct solution without an
exhaustive search.
Washburn uses a time-honored technique for solving two-person
zero-sum games; he guesses the optimal strategies and shows that they are
in equilibrium. The generalization of his procedure when I has m
strategies and II has n strategies would be
1) Let I (II) confine himself to all functions mapping {l,...,n(m)}
onto {1 , . .
.
,m(n) }. There are m (n ) such strategies.
2) For each such strategy, find the asmyptotic bound that it guarantees
for the player who is using it by writing a Linear Program with 2MN
variables.
3) Show that the greatest lower bound equals the least upper bound
(a theorem is required)
.
25
Given the theorem in 3) , one could find the ft-value of an m x n game
for one particular value of a by solving min{m ,n } Linear Programs
with 2mn variables each.
It is apparent that either method for finding the fi-value of a
large game would require a vast amount of computational effort, even if
all the required theorems can be proved. The central problem for matrix-
differential games would therefore seem to be the invention of a practical
procedure for finding solutions; it would be particularly valuable if
the procedure were able to find solutions for all a. By "practical,"
we mean a procedure where computational effort increases less than
exponentially with m and n.
26
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